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RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE ESTATE AND GIFT TAX

by
Barbara Redman*
The current progressive rate system of taxing estates and gifts, which taxes
(cumulative) transfers of larger amounts at higher marginal rates than it taxes such
transfers of lower amounts, has often been criticized. While many agree on
criticisms, few agree on remedies. Prescriptions range from loophole elimination
and more vigorous enforcement of the existing tax, to replacement with another
kind of tax, to outright abolition.
The tax itself is generally conceded to yield relatively little revenue.' For
1997, gross Internal Revenue Service collections from all tax sources totaled
$1,623,272,071,000; estate taxes amounted to $17,595,484,000, and gift taxes
$2,760,917,000. Estate taxes alone comprised 1.2% and gift taxes 0.2% of total IRS
collections.2 Gift tax revenues thus were only 15.7% of estate tax revenues, and
13.6% of transfer tax revenue. Of 216,509,690 tax returns filed in 1997, 97,000
were estate tax returns and 250,000 (72.9% of total estate and gift tax returns) were
gift tax returns.'

*Professor, John Marshall Law School (Atlanta, Georgia). J.D., University of Georgia;
Ph.D. in Economics, Iowa State University.
'Michael J. Graetz, To Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALEL. J. 259 (1983); Louis
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline ofthe Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REv. 223,238-39 (1956); Joel
C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition ofAll Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1215, 1217
(1984).
2
I.R.S. Data Book (Pub. 55B, 1997) at 3, Table 1.
3
One might argue that the small proportion of revenue collections obtained from gift taxes
reflects the unified transfer tax system, in effect since 1976, in which gift taxes due can be
offset against the unified credit available, with the result that the out-of-pocket tax liability
for inter vivos gifts is felt usually only at death. However, even for the twenty years from
1955 through 1974 (after which gift tax results may be distorted in anticipation of tax law
changes) gift taxes averaged only 11.8 % of estate tax collections. If the two unusually high
gift tax years of 1966 and 1973 are excluded, the average for the remaining years is 11.36%.
Statistical Appendix to Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the
Finances, Fiscal Year 1980 (U.S. Dept. of Treas., Sept. 1981), at 45, Table 10. Through
1976, gift taxes were administered separately from estate taxes and were governed by rates
which were 75% of estate tax rates. With this adjustment (and a heroic assumption that other
factors are constant), the proportion of gift to estate tax revenue in 1997 appears to be
roughly the same (11.7%) as before 1976.
4
I.R.S. Data Book, supra note 2, at 3, Table 2.
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The pattern of larger tax revenues resulting from a smaller number of estate
tax returns, compared with the gift tax statistics, does not derive solely from the fact
that under the unified transfer tax system, gift tax returns must be filed when a
taxable gift is made even if the tax will be "paid" through use of the unified credit.
Economic studies have also found that inter vivos gifts tend to be relatively large
in number and small in size compared with bequests. When costs of collection and
monitoring are taken into consideration, transfer taxes may even have a negative net
effect on revenue.6
The estate tax also has apparently done little to dilute the concentration of
wealth, which was one of its intended purposes.7 It is politically unpopular,
especially among those subject to it; and inefficient, in that taxpayers devote many
resources to finding ways to avoid it.8 However, it does contribute significantly to
the progressivity of the tax structure 9, which some find desirable both in itself and
to offset regressive elements present elsewhere in the tax system.10
A philosophical debate has raged for some time concerning the desirability

5

See, e.g., William G. Gale and John Karl Scholz, IntergenerationalTransfers and the
Accumulation of Wealth, J. OFECON.PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1994, at 145, 148 Table 1 9.4% of
their survey households reported making gifts of at least $3,000 to other households, with
an average gift for the three-year survey period of $16,202, and 3.7% reported receiving an
inheritance, with the average amount of $42,729. In the aggregate, inter vivos gifts (which
were underreported, due to the $3,000 threshhold) amounted to $126.1 billion, excluding
children's college expenses, and inheritance amounted to $131.1 billion.
6
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Casefor Wealth TransferTaxation, 104 YALE L. J. 283,
300-02 (1994).
7
Graetz, supra note 1, at 271-72; Dobris, supra note 1, at 1218. According to Eisenstein,
however, the primary purpose was revenue; not until the Franklin Roosevelt administration
did wealth equalization surface as an officially stated purpose of the estate tax. Eisenstein,
supra note 1, at 234-35.
8
McCaffery, supra note 6, at 302; Graetz, supra note 1, at 268; Dobris, supra note 1, at
1221. One source estimates that actual estate tax collections comprise only about a quarter
of what they would be if not for tax loopholes and other avoidance techniques; of this
discrepancy, half appears due to the difference in the number of estates actually paying
estate taxes, and the other half relates to differences in the average taxes collected per estate.
Edward N. Wolff, Commentary, 51 TAX L. REv. 517, 521 (1996).
9
Graetz, supra note 1, at 270.
1
Old.
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of progressive taxes in general11 and the desirability of a significant estate tax in any
form.' 2 McCaffery, for example, attempted to show that even though liberals tend
to favor a progressive estate tax in the name of equalization of economic
opportunity, and view with suspicion wealth not personally earned, actually the
same liberal premises would not support the current system which encourages
consumption by the wealthy as opposed to saving 13 and which encourages giving
inter vivos instead of at death.' 4 McCaffery favors a progressive consumption tax
and no estate tax. Graetz, on the other hand, believes that a strengthened
progressive estate tax accords with notions of fairness.' 5 Aaron and Munnell
suggest an inheritance or accessions tax.16 Ascher represents one extreme position,
that subject to certain limitations and exemptions inheritance of large amounts
should be abolished altogether (to the benefit of the government), 17 and Dobris, at
8
the other extreme, favors the abolition of all transfer taxes in their entirety.'

"The classic work is Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1952). In a 1982 update, Blum saw no reason to question
their earlier conclusion that the case for progressive taxation was uneasy at best, and in fact
believed that societal developments since then made the case even more uneasy. Walter J.
Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 60 TAXES 16 (1982).
2
See e.g., McCaffery, supra note 6; Graetz, supra note 1; Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing
Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69 (1990); Eisenstein, supra note 1.
3
If the government will take much of a lifetime's accumulated savings, there is less point
in saving. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 294.
4
Inter vivos giving can take advantage of the $10,000 per year per donee exclusion from gift
tax, so that a wealthy person who plans well ahead of his death can transfer a large amount
tax free. Further, the gift tax amount is excluded from the base of the gift, which lowers the
effective rate of the gift tax as compared with the estate tax. For example, assume a 50%
marginal tax rate and a taxable gift/bequest of $50,000. If the gift is made inter vivos, the
donor parts with $75,000 [the gift itself plus $25,000 in tax]. If instead of the inter vivos gift,
this amount is left in donor' s estate at his death, of the additional $75,000 in the estate the
government would get $37,500. See McCaffery, supra note 6, at 314-16. However, the
preference for giving inter vivos is still far less than it was before 1976, when gift tax rates
were only 3/4 of estate tax rates.
15Graetz, supra note 1, at 284.
6Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessingthe Role for Wealth Transfer Taxes, 45
NAT'LTAx J. 119 (1992). Strictly speaking, an accessions tax covers more than inheritance;
it resembles the current unified transfer tax but from the point of view of the recipient, in
that it taxes all transfers received by the taxpayer (including gifts) from all sources over the
taxpayer's lifetime. Jack M. Kinnebrew, Estate and Gift Tax Reform: A Compendium of
Thought, 24 Sw. L.J. 608, 631 (1970).
7Ascher, supra note 12.
'8Dobris, supra note 1.
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This article will not review the philosophical arguments about the
legitimacy of unearned wealth versus the right of a person to give as she pleases
with her own accumulation. Rather, it will focus on a view of the tax not yet
explored to any great extent' 9 in legal and political circles, but supported by recent
economic research, and to argue, if not against the tax itself, at least against the
progressive nature of the tax.
Under the traditional view that bequests and "gifts" are purely gratuitous,
then the recipient has no moral or legal entitlement to any part of it. Thus, no
apparent reason exists why the government should not reduce the bequest by
taxation of whatever form it chooses, subject of course to Constitutional constraints.
Progressive taxation is a permissible, but by no means inescapable, option in light
of the social goal of reduction of wealth inequality, assuming that this goal is
widely accepted and indeed furthered by progressive taxation. However, if the
bequest or gift is not purely gratuitous, but a recognition of and compensation for
past services rendered to the donor by the beneficiary, progressive taxation loses
much of its logic, especially if evidence should show that progressivity does not
even carry the macroeconomic benefits claimed. The closest tax analogy to this
property transfer situation is sales taxation. States have imposed sales taxes on
services, though only recently, but never yet has a state imposed a progressive sales
tax on services. Therefore, to the extent that a donor makes gifts and bequests in
tacit exchange for services, either no tax should be imposed or only a proportionate
tax should be imposed.
I.

HISTORY

The estate and gift tax has undergone several changes since it was first
instituted, the most drastic of which occurred in 1976. The estate tax has come and
gone several times since 1797,20 but a gift tax did not appear until 1924.21 The gift
tax was perceived as a necessary adjunct to the estate tax, in order to prevent estate
tax avoidance by the giving of property inter vivos, and also was intended to

19

The one partial exception is Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for
Abolishing the Estate Tax, 51 TAX L. REv. 495, 509 (1996). Holtz-Eakin describes briefly
many of the aspects of the economic literature discussed in this article, but only in the
context of his critique of McCaffery's proposals; he does not develop its implications for
positive
policy recommendations.
20Eisenstein,
supranote 1, at 224-32. Its earlier incarnations were as inheritance taxes levied
on legacies received by the transferees. The progressive estate tax imposed on decedent's
estate
became a permanent part of tax policy in 1916. Id. at 230.
211d.
at 232. This tax was repealed in 1926, but reimposed in 1932.
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supplement the income tax. 22
Until the 1976 tax reforms, the gift tax structure overtly encouraged inter
vivos giving; in addition to features which were left unchanged by the reforms, gift
tax rates were only 75% of estate tax rates.23 Two criticisms predominated: first,
that a transfer is a transfer, whether timed at donor's death or earlier, and all such
transfers should be treated alike analytically; second, since only the wealthy could
afford to do without current consumption by making gifts inter vivos, the dual
estate and gift tax rate system favored the wealthy at the expense of those of small
and moderate wealth and encouraged the latter to make lifetime transfers they could
ill afford.24
However, scholarly and professional opinion at the time the unified tax
structure was debated was by no means unanimous. While substantial support did
exist for an integrated estate and gift tax system, dissenters were sufficiently
numerous to cause the A.L.I. to choose to make no recommendation as to a unified
transfer tax system.25 Opponents of unification argued primarily that the
government should indeed encourage lifetime giving, because younger persons to
whom the property would be transferred would be more inclined to take productive
risks with it. 26 Second, lower gift tax rates could be justified because the
government collected the gift tax under the dual system earlier (because the transfer
is made earlier) than a corresponding estate tax on transferred assets. 27 A third
argument against change, besides the upheaval which any major change would
create, was that in spite of the favored tax treatment of inter vivos gifts, the dual tax
structure had not in fact encouraged such gifts. 28 Economists had noted this
reluctance to make gifts before death, and suggested both economic and

22

Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 243-44; FREDERICK J. GERHART, THE GIFr TAX. 2 (1980).

231976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3364.
24
1d. See also Kinnebrew, supra note 16; A.L.L Recommendations on Estate and
Gift
Taxation, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 111, 124-25 (1968).
25 Kinnebrew, supra note 16, at 618; John H. Young, ProposedRevisions of the Federal
Estate and Gift Tax Laws: The ALl Revisited, 5 GA. L. REV. 75, 79 n. 34 (1970).
26
Kinnebrew, supra note 16, at 616; Young, supra note 25, at 81; Marvin K. Collie, Estate
and Gift Tax Revision, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 441, 443 (1973) (opposing unification and
describing the 1932 gift tax enactment as a deliberate choice by Congress to encourage
giving inter vivos for this reason).
27Collie, supra note 26, at 443.
28
Kinnebrew, supra note 16, at 617.
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noneconomic reasons for it. 29 Since massive lifetime giving had not occurred
despite the tax incentive to do so, there was no need to reform the tax structure to
diminish this incentive.
The proponents of a unified transfer tax system carried the day, however,
with the 1976 Tax Reform Act. Although some incentives for lifetime giving
remained, such as the gift tax exclusion per year per beneficiary and the exclusion
of the tax from the gift tax base, both gifts and death transfers became subject to the
same progressive rate schedule. Congress raised the unified credit and gift tax
exclusion in 1981 to offset the effects of inflation, 30 and the estate exemption
equivalent (and hence the unified credit) still further in 1997.31When the 1997 Act
is fully phased in, in 2006, estates of under one million dollars will be exempt from
taxation. The House Committee believed that the greatly increased unified credit
"will encourage saving, promote capital formation and entrepreneurial activity, and
help to preserve existing family-owned farms and businesses. '32 Absent from the

29

Id.; Eli Schwartz and J. Richard Aronson, The Preferencefor Accumulation vs. Spending:
Gift and Estate Taxation,and the Timing of Wealth Transfers,22 NAT'LTAX J. 390 (1969).

Schwartz and Aronson demonstrate economic reasons for holding instead of giving money:
the individual's preference for present spending over future receipts and the time value of
money. In the situation where donor intends that all income from his capital be spent, but
neither donor nor donee needs the money and donor is indifferent as to which of them uses
it, the present value to the donor of holding the money (and possibly spending the earnings
from it himself) may exceed the present value of the net gift and its earnings, especially
where donor's life expectancy is high. If, on the other hand, the donor's motive is merely to
transfer the maximum amount of wealth, he will make the gift. Based on the mortality rates
available to them (1959-61), Schwartz and Aronson concluded that donors who wish to
spend earnings rather than transfer maximum wealth will leave an estate if they happen to
die before reaching age 68. Id. at 394. Noneconomic reasons to hold the money include a
desire to retain control of funds and simple reluctance to plan for death. Id. at 391.
301981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 225,230. The gift tax exclusion was raised to $10,000 per beneficiary
per year, and the increase in the credit available against the tax meant that estates of under
$600,000 were exempt from taxation. This may have resulted in part from a feeling in 1976
that the exemption equivalent then enacted was insufficient; most witnesses then supported
a greater exemption than Congress gave (approximately $120,000, though this in itself
exceeded the previous estate tax exemption of $60,000 and gift tax exemption of $30,000),
and the exemption equivalent would have had to rise to $200,000 just to keep pace with
inflation since 1942 when it had last been revised. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437-38 (minority
of Philip Crane and William Ketchum), 3357.
views
31Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
321997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 747-48. Although the House Committee also favored indexing both
the unified credit exemption equivalent and the gift tax exclusion against inflation, id. at
748, the final version indexed the gift tax exclusion but not the unified credit exemption
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debate in all years of tax reform, however, was the issue of whether the progressive
rate structure of transfer taxation should be retained.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION AND ESTATE/GIFT TAX

ISSUES
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of progressive tax
rates only rarely, and not at all for over sixty years. Only a few cases, on
progressivity and on estate and gift taxes as such, have much relevance to the
present argument.
In Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,33 the state of Illinois had
taxed inheritances by distant relatives of the deceased at a higher rate than it taxed
inheritances by close relatives; the Court upheld the tax system, as an excise on the
privilege of inheritance, against a challenge based on equal protection. The Court
deferred to the legislature's judgment that the classification was reasonable, adding
in dicta that benefits (by the recipients) as well as taxes increased to a greater
degree with amounts received. The characterization of the tax as an excise rather
than as a tax on property may have influenced the Court; Justice Brewer's dissent
stated that "[the majority] seems to [have] conceded that if this were a tax upon
property such increase in the rate of taxation could not be sustained...,3 Blum and
Kalven in 1952 agreed that "there are at least good grounds for doubting that the
majority at that date would have sustained a progressive tax on property or
35
income.
The Magoun case involved a state inheritance tax. On the federal level,
36
Congress is constrained in wealth taxation by the Constitutional prohibition
against direct taxes (unless these are apportioned among the states by population).

equivalent. Id. at 1206. Concern for illiquid family farms and businesses had been evident
in 1976; several members of Congress criticized the bill finally passed because the Ways and
Means Committee proposal had more directly targeted family farms and businesses for
greater estate tax relief (and less net revenue loss) through use of a credit split in their favor.
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3429 (supplemental views of Charles Vanik, Charles Rangel, Fortney
Stark,
Abner Mikva, and Joseph Fisher).
33Magoun
v. Illinois Trust and Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
34
1d. at 302 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
35Blum
& Kalven, supra note 11, at 425.
36U.S.

CONST. art.

I, § 9.
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It is generally believed37 that a federal tax on the ownership of property would, as
a direct tax, present serious constitutional problems. The Court has avoided the
problem by characterizing a tax laid upon the happening of an event, such as
transmission of title upon death, as an indirect tax. Estate and gift taxes, then, in
theory are excise taxes and not subject to the direct tax condition,38 though still
constrained by the Fifth Amendment due process requirements.
The federal gift tax presents a somewhat different set of issues than the
estate tax. Also characterized as an excise, the taxable event for a gift is the transfer
of property during life. But Congress knew that the more favorable tax treatment
of gifts as opposed to estates gave wealthy donors an incentive to give property on
their deathbeds, so it included in the taxable estate gifts made in contemplation of
death, as testamentary-transfer equivalents. Congress further provided that gifts
made within two years of death would be conclusively presumed to have been made
in contemplation of death and thus subject to estate taxation.
Almost immediately after the gift tax was enacted, the Supreme Court
expressed its opinion that Congress may subject to estate taxation gifts made in
contemplation of death, for the purpose of preventing estate tax evasion.39 The twoyear conclusive presumption made a good deal of sense in terms of administrative
simplicity. But the Court in Heiner v. Donnan4° found a logical flaw: the tax on a
person's estate therefore became measured by property owned by another (that is,
the gift recipient) and unconnected with the death. The estate tax was imposed on
gifts made in contemplation of death by reason of the decedent's state of mind in
making the gifts, but with the two-year rule Congress rendered decedent's actual
state of mind irrelevant.4 ' Therefore, the conclusive presumption was arbitrary and

37

Louis Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learningof the Supreme Court, 3 TAX L.
REv. 395, 398-99 (1948). Accord, Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood:Estate Taxes and
the Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 771 (1998).
38

New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41, 81 (1900)). To the Eisnercourt, it mattered not that an-estate tax, unlike an inheritance
tax, might be inevitable. Id. at 349. An individual might be able to refuse an inheritance and
thus avoid paying the tax on it, but an estate has no such option with regard to an estate tax.
The gift tax received similar treatment. The Court in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124
(1929), upheld the gift tax as an indirect tax on the power to give, which falls short of a
(direct) tax on the uses and powers of property generally. Id. at 138.
39Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U.S. 531,542 (1927). However, the Court ruled in favor of the
taxpayer in that case, since the transfer in question was made before the tax was enacted.
'Ieiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
41
1d. at 327-28; Eisenstein, supra note 37, at 454.
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capricious, and violated due process.4 2 Until the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the taxation
of gifts made in contemplation of death (by then a three-year rule) involved only
a rebuttable presumption, and thus engendered substantial litigation.43
Although the Court has never overruled Heiner v. Donnan explicitly, one
may seriously question whether it would still ban such a conclusive presumption.
In Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,4 it ruled that the government may,
without violation of due process, tax at a donor's death a completed lifetime

transfer even if no interest actually "passed" by reason of the death and even if the
transfer was made so far before death as not to appear to be an attempt to evade
estate taxes.4 5 Congress may tax completed gifts made in contemplation of death,
and may declare that a completed gift with some powers retained by the donor is
a taxable gift in order to effectuate the exercise of its admitted power to levy an
excise on testamentary transfers and prevent evasion. 6 If the government may tax
inter vivos transfers at death, whether or not it does so on the basis of a conclusive
presumption becomes irrelevant.
Knowlton v. Moore4 7 involved a federal inheritance tax with graduated rates
on inheritances over $10,000; the issues were whether the graduated rates violated
the uniformity clause and substantive due process. Although the Court decided the
case primarily on uniformity, Justice White expressly reserved for legislative
judgment the question whether a progressive tax is more just than a proportional
one.4 ' His attitude is especially interesting in view of the fact that the Court very
soon entered actively into precisely such economic questions, of which cases
Lochner v. New York 49 became the most notorious.

Progressive income tax rates adopted after the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment were addressed and upheld summarily by the Court in Brushaberv.

42

Heiner, 285 U.S. at 328.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3367-68.
"Helvering
v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S, 85 (1935).
45
Eisenstein, supra note 37, at 489-500. Eisenstein believed that the Court overruled Heiner
sub silento. He therefore reasoned that a unified transfer tax system, which he favored,
would be constitutional. Id.
'Helvering, 296 U.S. at 90. The Court distinguished Heiner v. Donnan by stating that its
conclusive presumption was so grossly unreasonable as to violate the due process clause of
the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 92.
47
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
41Id. at 41.
49
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
411976
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Union Pacific.50 Again, the Court assumed that the nature of the rate structure was
a question of economic policy which was reserved for the legislature. Blum and
Kalven, while approving the Court's conclusion in light of current (1952) notions
of substantive due process, point out that the Court never really addressed the
merits of progression:
It remains true however that the total wisdom the Court has offered
on the merits of progression comes to the following: the one line
observation of Justice McKenna in the Magoun case that (at least
as to legacies) benefits increase to a greater degree than the rates;
and the statements by Chief Justice White in the Knowlton and
Brushaber cases that the issue is a matter of controversy in
economics. 5'
Although Blum and Kalven's conclusion that "[t]here can be no doubt that
progression today is immune from constitutional attack ' ,52 may be accurate, they did
omit from their discussion one 1935 case, Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,53 in
which the Court struck down a state-imposed progressive gross sales tax. In
sustaining the challenge on equal protection grounds, the Court stated:
the excise is laid in respect of the same activity ... the making of

a sale. Although no difference is suggested, so far as concerns the
transaction which is the occasion of the tax, between the taxpayer's
first sale of the year and his thousandth, different rates may apply
to them. The statute operates to take as the tax a percentage of each
dollar due or paid upon every sale, but increases the percentage if
the sale which is the occasion of the tax succeeds the
consummation of other sales of a specified aggregate amount...
Thus understood, the operation of the statute is unjustifiably
unequal, whimsical, and arbitrary, as much so as would be a tax on
tangible personal property, say cattle, stepped up in rate on each
additional animal owned by the taxpayer, or a tax on land similarly
graduated according to the number of parcels owned.54
"It exacts from two persons different amounts for the privilege of doing exactly

50Brushaber
51Blum

v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
& Kalven, supra note 11, at 426-427.
521d. at 426.
53Stewart
Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, (1935).
541d. at 556-57.
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similar acts because the one has performed the act oftener than the other. 5 5 Since
this tax was on gross sales and not net income, the argument that increased sales
volume results in increased profits and thus increased ability to pay the tax was
flawed 56 and could not form a rational basis on which to justify the differential
treatment.57
A legal argument exists, advanced by Calvin Massey, that progressive
taxation is an uncompensated taking and therefore unconstitutional.58 The Supreme
Court has never ruled on this issue. Massey argues that while taxation in itself is
regarded as a compensated taking, progressive taxation seizes a disproportionate
share of taxpayer property: since the Takings Clause of the Constitution requires
that public burdens be shared by all, rather than borne by a select few, and
progressive taxation burdens the few for the benefit of the many, progressive
taxation is therefore unconstitutional.
Massey then examines progressivity in light of the Court's regulatory.
takings doctrine, and concludes that the same rules, applied to progressivity, would
support his argument of unconstitutionality.59 One rule, that when regulations of

55

1d. at 566.
56d. at 558.
57

Contemporary commentators understood this tax and this decision as a chain store issue;
earlier, the Court had upheld against equal protection challenges a number of state efforts
to tax chain stores more heavily than small operations by progressive classifications such as
number of stores in a chain. See. e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87
(1935) (upholding graduated license tax as applied to large chain of gas stations by a 5-4
decision). See, also, Clinton G.. Brown, Jr., Notes and Comments: Constitutional Law Taxation - Chain Stores, 13 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1935).
58Calvin
R. Massey, Takings and ProgressiveRate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
85
(1996).
59
Massey echoes Blum and Kalven, supra note 11, in his critique of the classic utilitarian
argument for progressive taxation, "sacrifice theory", which is based on the premise that
money carries a declining marginal utility and therefore equal or proportionate sacrifice of
utility requires more than proportionate dollar contribution by the wealthy. While this is a
possible result of declining marginal utility, it is not an inevitable result, as Blum and Kalv~n
demonstrate in depth, supra note 11, at 462-79. Much depends on the precise shape of the
utility function, which is unknown and unmeasurable and may not even universally decline.
Even if one could legitimately infer from it a progressive rate structure, one could not deduce
the steepness of the desired progressivity. Further, any social policy application of marginal
utility theory inevitably requires interpersonal comparisons of utility, which is impossible.
Massey, supra note 59, at 108-10. Other justifications for progressivity, according to
Massey, are either variations on sacrifice theory or even less persuasive arguments that
government use of money is more socially beneficial than if the wealthy used it themselves.
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property permanently dispossess the owner, a per se taking has occurred, clearly
applies to taxation since the government appropriates all tax money. The remaining
question is whether the taking is uncompensated. While Massey concedes that
proportionate rate taxation would be considered compensated, he denies that the
marginal amount taken by the progressivity element would be considered
compensated.6 ° In this, he is supported by Blum and Kalven, who characterize as
"doubtful" the claim that benefits are also progressive. 61 Of similar effect is the rule
that a regulation of property which leaves its owner with no economically viable
use is a taking.62 Massey concedes, however, that a court which rejected the above
analogies and therefore balanced public benefits against private costs would be
unlikely to strike progressive taxation.6 3
III. ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON BEQUEST MOTIVATION
To date, the legal literature on estate planning, and on the merits of the
estate tax in particular, has assumedthat an individual makes testamentary transfers
gratuitously, either out -ofpure altruism or, possibly, out of motives of building
family dynasties (as in the debate over the generation-skipping tax). Pure altruism
carries no obvious recommendations for any particular type of tax structure. To the
extent that society wishes to prevent the establishment of family dynasties and the
resulting concentration of wealth, a progressive rate seems appropriate. 64 But if
altruism is not the primary motive for bequests, or even a significant motive for
bequests, the case for progressivity suffers. And if progressive rates do not in fact
lessen the concentration of wealth, the case collapses.
What is the primary motive of bequests? First, consider that for some
testators, but especially for those without close family ties, the bequest may be
unintentional. Suppose a testator had no motive for waiting until his death to make
bequests. Instead, he either made gifts during his lifetime or consumed all his
wealth himself. In a world of perfect information (especially information
concerning his own longevity and health needs), this would be the optimum strategy

Id.
60Massey,
supra note 58, at 112-14.
6'Blum
& Kalven, supra note 11, at 454.
62Massey,
supra note 58, at 118-20.
63
d. at 121.
64
1t appears that at least one quarter of national wealth is held as intergenerational savings.
McCaffery, supra note 6, at 308.
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with respect to minimizing estate taxes. 65 Any intended bequests, he would give
inter vivos over time so as to take advantage of the $10,000 per year per donee
exclusion from gift tax. If a perfect annuity market existed, so as to eliminate the
need for precautionary saving for his own needs (our testator would buy an annuity
to cover these needs), any remaining estate would be minimal and unintentional and
estate tax could be avoided entirely. To the extent that the annuity market is
imperfect, his need for precautionary savings forms an estate which, however, must
be considered an unplanned bequest since he expected to consume it all himself. To
the extent that the estate tax has any effect on behavior, it would affect only this
unplanned estate, because it motivates him to shift any planned bequests to earlier
points in time. Therefore, in the absence of bequest motives, such as to maintain a
reserve with which to reward individuals for services rendered later in his life, and
with the exception of those few estates so great that giving cannot be accomplished
in small installments, the estate tax should reap little revenue. What it does reap is
derived from market imperfections such as imperfect foresight. Thus, the low
revenue yield cited at the beginning of this article should come as no surprise. What
is taxed is the inability to forecast the future perfectly, penalizing those whose
incorrect guesses are the furthest off the mark.
Second, assuming an estate the testator wishes to divide at his death, on
what basis will he choose to divide it? The majority of wealth holders with more
66
than one child choose to divide it approximately equally among their children.
65

Sheng Cheng Hu, UncertainLifetime, the Annuity Market,and Estate Taxation,40 J. PUB.
ECON. 217 (1989); see also Michael D. Hurd, Savings ofthe Elderly and DesiredBequests,
77 AM. ECON. REV. 298 (1.987) (finding through an empirical study that the elderly do
dissave over time; suggesting that bequests are the result of mortality risk combined with a

very weak market for private annuities, rather than a desire to leave an estate); Andrew B.
Abel, Precautionary Saving- and Accidental Bequests, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1985)(according to his model, accidental bequests can account for a potentially sizeable
fraction of aggregate wealth); James B. Davies, Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption, and
Dissaving in Retirement, 89 J. POL. EcON. 561 (1981)(finding that a theoretical life-cycle

model, in conjunction with estimates of parameters taken from other studies, supports
accidental-bequest model). However, Bernheim et. al. point to the absence of a strong
private annuity market in the United States, and to TIAA-CREF studies which find a desire
to bequeath an estate, to doubt whether the accidental-bequest model accurately describes
many individuals. B. Douglas Bernheim et. al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045, 1069-70 (1985).
66 Mark 0. Wilhelm, Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings: Testing the
Altruistic Model of Bequests, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 874 (1996), found that 68.6% of divided

estates, from 1982 IRS data, were divided exactly equally, and 88 % "approximately"
equally. Id. at 880. However, Tomes's data, a much smaller sample of probate records and
interviews in 1964-65 in the Cleveland area, produced a much lower figure; only 41.6% of
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Whether this decision is merely a default decision (for in the absence of direction
to the contrary a bequest to "my children," and of course an intestate taking by
"children," will result in equal shares), or a conscious choice based perhaps on fear
of inter-sibling conflict if division were unequal,67 is uncertain. No empirical study
has examined this question. It is also unclear whether testators intentionally
accumulated an estate to leave to children or whether this estate is an unintentional
bequest resulting from imperfect foresight as suggested above. Though some
attitudinal research indicates that a desire to accumulate an estate appears to be
prevalent in at least half the population, even in households without children,6 8 this
same study also concluded that only 20% of lifetime private net worth resulted from
intentional estate building. 69 To the extent that the estate is unintentional, the default
distribution among all children equally makes a good deal of sense. Intentional
transfers, which could well be unequal, may be more likely to occur inter vivos.
So far, the bulk of the tax burden falls on those who are most incapable of
predicting the future. The fairness of this can be questioned. Suppose, however, we
limit ourselves to that 20% or so of net worth which is the result of intentional
building. What is the principal motive for these accumulations?
The two motives most often suggested are altruistic concerns for children's
well-being and compensation of children (or others) for services rendered during
old age. The altruism model was first developed as an extension of a household
production model, wherein the parent's utility function includes the utility of the
children as one of its factors.7 ° This model's predictions include bequests to
children by such "altruistic" parents, even if the children behave selfishly. In fact,
the "rotten kid" of this theorem finds it in his/her own self-interest to help the

his estates were divided exactly equally, and 50.4% approximately equally. Nigel Tomes,
The Family, Inheritance, and the IntergenerationalTransmission of Inequality, 89 J. POL.

EcON. 928 (1981).
67Donald Cox

& Mark R. Rank, Inter Vivos Transfers and IntergenerationalExchange, 74
REV. ECON. AND STAT. 305 (1992).
6 John Laitner & F. Thomas Juster, New Evidence on Altruism: A Study of TIAA-CREF
Retirees, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 893 (1996); see also B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong dre
Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and
Annuities,
99 J. POL. ECON. 899 (1991).
69

Iaitner & Juster, supra note 68, at 907. The figure of 20% is open to question. Gale &
Scholz, supra note 5, at 147, found that intended inter vivos transfers are the source of at
least 20% of aggregate wealth, and bequests account for an additional 31% of net wealth.
This brings the total to at least 51%, excluding parental spending for children's college
education.
Id. at 156.
70Gary
S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions,82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974).
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altruistic parent maximize family income, though only if the parent retains the last
word (that is, the ability to make bequests).? Soon, however, researchers presented
an alternative explanation for bequests to children, that of exchange for services
rendered.72 A small flurry of empirical studies resulted, which attempted to
73
distinguish and test for these two motives, with sometimes inconsistent results.
Studies generally have focused on non-farm households with two or more
children and unequal bequests among children, in order to avoid the liquidity
complications associated with family farms and the questions of testator intent
associated with equal distributions. Some studies have utilized household
surveys, 74 and some have used IRS tax form data. 75 Some have studied bequests at
death,76 while others have looked at inter vivos transfers.7 7

Are inter vivos transfers or bequests at death more significant? Joulfaian
and Wilhelm' s78 interview data found that while two-thirds of all dollars transferred
are inter vivos gifts, average inheritances per heir were 12.2 times larger than inter
vivos transfers received by those who received both types of transfers. 79 Their IRS
data showed that only about 25% of decedents made gifts during the three years
prior to their death. They interpret this as a preference for bequeathing as opposed
to dispersing wealth during life;8 another possibility is that while parents may be
willing to donate relatively small amounts at relatively frequent intervals during
life, the large donations take place at death, a one-time event after which the parent
will have no further need for the money.
How can the altruism and exchange motives be distinguished empirically?

7

Jack Hirshleifer, Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The ImportanceofHaving the Last

Word, 15 J. ECON. LIT. .500 (1977).
72See e.g., Bernheim et. al., supra note 65; Donald Cox, Motives for Private Income
Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON. 508 (1987).
73
See e.g. Cox & Rank, supra note 67 (finding that the results support exchange); Tomes,

supra
note 66 (finding that the results support altruism).
74
See e.g. Cox & Rank, supra note 67.
See e.g. Wilhelm, supra note 66.
e.g., Bernheim et. al., supra note 65, Tomes, supra note 66, and Wilhelm, supra note

76See

66.
17See

e.g., Cox & Rank, supra note 67, Cox & Rank, supra note 67.

78David Joulfaian & Mark D. Wilhelm, Inheritance and Labor Supply, 29 J. HUM.
RESOURCES

1205 (1994).

79These results are generally supported by Gale & Scholz, supra note 5.
8
Joulfaian & Wilhelm supra note 78, at 1232 n. 49.
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Under the altruism model,81 the higher the child's income (other factors equal, such
as family affection), the less likely a bequest, and if a bequest occurs, the smaller
the amount of the bequest. The better off the child, the less he or she needs parental
assistance. Under the exchange model, on the other hand, the higher the child's
income the less likely a bequest, but if one occurs, the greater the amount of the
bequest. The reason for this is that the higher income child will have a higher
opportunity cost of his or her time: an hour spent in the work force instead of
attending to parents will yield greater pecuniary reward, compared with that of a
lower-income sibling. This child is less likely to spend time providing personal
services to aging parents (or thus to receive compensation for doing so) and will
require greater compensation from parents to induce him or her to divert a given
amount of time away from pursuit of his or her own earnings.
Tomes8 2 tested these hypotheses using inheritance data taken from probate
court records and interviews with these decedents' children. Recipients' income had
a statistically significant negative effect on amount of inheritance, thus supporting
the altruism model predictions. Tomes notes, however, that this result contrasts with
previous studies done with this data.83 Visits of child to parents showed a surprising
negative effect, which is inconsistent with the exchange model and with previous
research,8 4 though reconciliation with it is possible.85 The income elasticity of the
deceased parent's income with respect to children's inheritance is 0.84;86 if parent's
income rose 10 %, bequests to child would rise 8.4%. However, the data also
suggested that more educated parents invested more heavily during life in their
children's education and thus bequeathed them less in material wealth at death87 .
Bernheim et. al. used the reverse of this functional form, explaining visits
to parents by children as a function of parents' bequeathable wealth. The effect of
bequeathable wealth, as opposed to non-bequeathable wealth such as social security
and pensions, was positive and statistically significant, 88 but only in multi-child
families89 (in which an implied threat of disinheritance would be more credible than
in single-child families). Bernheim et al describe this conclusion as difficult to
81These implications

of the exchange and altruism models are taken from Cox & Rank, supra
note 67, at 306-07.
82Tomes, supra
note 66.
83
1d. at 943.
84See e.g.,
Bernheim et. al., supra note 65, described infra.
85Tomes,
supra note 66 at 946 n. 24.
861d. at
946.
871d. at 947.
88
See Bernheim et. al., supra note 65, at 1064.
891d. at 1066,
Table 2.
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reconcile with any known model of bequests other than the strategic model.9 ° It
should be noted, however, that their sample of individuals (aged 58 - 63) in a
Retirement History survey conducted by the Social Security Administration,
included no information on actual bequests, because the informants (the parents)
were still living, nor on intended bequests.
Cox and Rank,9 1 using data on inter vivos transfers, estimated two
equations, one to determine the effect of child's income, parent's income, and
quantity of services rendered by the child to the parent,92 as well as a variety of
demographic factors, on the probability of an inter vivos transfer, and the other
equation to determine the influence of the same factors on the amount of such inter
vivos transfers. The results were as predicted for the exchange model, but not for
the altruism model. The negative effect of child's earnings on the probability of a
transfer was statistically significant, but small. The effect of child's earnings on the
amount of the transfer was positive and statistically significant. The services
rendered by the child positively affected the probability of a transfer as predicted,
but had no significant effect on the amount of the transfer. This accords with
Kurz,93 who in examining transfers as a function of assets and net governmental
transfers received found that it is the decision to give (to the younger generation)
that is sensitive to socioeconomic conditions, while the amount that families intend
to give each other is less explicable by cost and reward conditions. When Cox and
Rank replaced contact and help with distance as a proxy for services, distance had
a significantly negative effect on the probability of a transfer, suggesting that the
geographically closer children who were in a position to provide more services did
so and were compensated.94 However, all of the factors considered, when taken
together, explained only about 5% of the amount of the transfer.95

901d. at

1066-67.

91

See supra note 68. Cox & Rank, supra note 67.

92

These services were measured by two variables: contact with parents, i.e., number of visits
and phone calls; and help, a dummy variable of whether or not children reported giving
informal help.
93

Mordecai Kurz, Capital Accumulation and the Characteristics of Private Inter-

generationalTransfers, 51 EcONOMICA 1, 12 (1984).
94

Further disaggregation of the data which analyzed separately contact with/support from

husband's parents and wife's parents also supported the notion that those who received the
contact provided the financial support. "Transfers from the husband's parents are positively

related to contact and help targeted to them, but not to services targeted to the wife's
parents." Cox & Rank, supra note 67, at 313.
95

1d. at 309, Table 1, and at 312, Table 2.
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Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 6 attempted a direct test of altruism, apart
from the estate context. They reasoned that if intergenerational households were
linked altruistically, individual households would base their consumption on a
collective budget constraint (not on each household's individual budget constraint)
so that the distribution of consumption between parent and child would be
independent of the distribution of their incomes. A child, for example, would base
a consumption decision not on what he or she could personally afford, but on what
the extended family as a unit could afford. This hypothesis was rejected; while
altruistic transfers do take place, very few U.S. households have links this strong.
If such a linkage had been prevalent, it would have had implications for estate tax
policy which treats each generation, not a family dynasty, as the appropriate unit
of analysis.97
More recently, Wilhelm tested the altruism model as applied to bequests,
using IRS tax returns. 98 His data consisted of matched sets of parent's 1982 estate
tax returns and parent's and children's income tax returns. His results also showed
little empirical support for the altruism hypothesis, even when his data set excluded
those more likely to be nonaltruistic such as childless decedents. Neither, however,
did his coefficients on child's earnings support the exchange hypothesis. To the
extent that the altruism motive existed at all, it appeared to occur where the children
had incomes below $45,000 and where large earnings differences existed among
siblings,99 and among one-child families (in which parents cannot as credibly
threaten to bequeath more to another child), 100 but these effects were very small.
Kuehlwein approached the issue from the standpoint of tax rates.' 0 1 He
argued that an altruistic testator would be indifferent as to the timing of gifts, and
would give so as to equalize his/her marginal tax rates" yet this has not occurred.
Possible explanations include the absence of attractive annuities, because his model
assumed away precautionary saving, and strategic motivations (that is, motivations
other than altruism) for bequests.
In general, the empirical results on the altruism and exchange motives are
mixed. The most likely conclusion is that although both motives coexist, the
96Joseph

G. Altonji et. al., Is the Extended FamilyAltruistically Linked? DirectTests Using
Micro Data, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1177 (1992).
97Holtz-Eakin,

supra note 19, at 505.

9

Wilhelm, supra note 66.
991d. at 888.
'0 1d. at 890.
''Michael Kuehlwein, The Non-equalizationof True Gift and Estate Tax Rates, 53 J. PUB.

ECON. 319, 323 (1994).
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exchange motive is far more dominant, and the altruism motive far less dominant
than previously supposed. One reconciliation of the diverse findings offered by
Tomes 10 2 is that services may be rewarded inter vivos (as Cox and Rank's study
supports), while altruism plays more of a role in allocations at death (though
Wilhelm's subsequent study casts doubt on this). However, Wilhelm's study
suggests that even this altruistic effect is small, especially when considered against
his finding that the bulk of estate divisions among children are equal. According to
Wilhelm,
the only parent preferences consistent with equal division are those
in which the bequest is 'accidental,' or those in which utility is
gained from the size of bequest. However, the ['accidental'] theory
offers no refutable hypotheses concerning estate division, and the
['utility from size'] theory predicts no unequal division, which is
inconsistent with the observation that a substantial minority do
bequeath unequal amounts to their children."' 0 3
Bernheim et. al., arguing for the strategic motive against the fact that the bulk of
estate divisions are equal, point out that inequilibrium threats (to influence
children's behavior) are never carried out; the mere possibility of unequal division
suffices. 10 4 Therefore, the fact of equal division poses less of a problem for the
strategic bequest model than for the altruism model.
Some issues which emerge from the foregoing relate to tax policy.
Assuming no bequest motives exist, is it fair to tax primarily those whose lifespan
is shorter than expected or whose health has been better than expected (and who
thus fail to consume their entire estate as expected)? Would not the rational
individual then place less emphasis on precautionary saving for old age, and thus
greater reliance on governmental programs? One could interpret the recent raising
of the estate exemption as a positive response to this argument; decedents will not
be "penalized" by taxation for precautionary saving to a certain degree, but estates
of over a million dollars arguably represent more than should be needed as a
precaution.
Assuming that bequest motives of altruism exist: if the testator performs a
service to public policy in redistribution of wealth and reduction of wealth
inequality (assuming for the sake of argument that this is a good thing), why should

' Tomes, supra note 66, at 946 n.24.

'"3Wilhelm, supra note 66, at 891.
'°4Bernheim et. al., supra note 65, at 1071.
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this behavior be discouraged by tax policy, especially progressive tax policy? To
some extent, this intrafamily redistribution may substitute for governmental
attempts to do the same thing, and should be encouraged rather than discouraged.
Assuming that bequest motives of exchange exist, a case for taxation can
be made by analogy to the sales of services - but not a case for progressive taxation.
Like sales of services, many transfers are made in return, implicit or explicit, for
services rendered. Unlike sales of services, donor and donee usually have formed
no express contract, and the donor unilaterally determines the amount of the
transfer. But does this make it, in theory, any less of an exchange? Contract law
provides that one party may set a price unilaterally, at least in some
circumstances.'0 5 Federal tax law defines a "gift" as the extent to which property is
transferred "for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.' 0 6 But in the case of family services, who is to say what is "adequate and
full consideration?" A fair price measures what the item exchanged is worth to a
willing buyer and a willing seller, which does not necessarily correspond with what
a third party believes the item is worth. Who is to say that a testator's bequest
exceeded the value to the testator of services rendered? This argument is supported
by the economic research 10 7 which found that services rendered could explain the
act of transferring inter vivos more easily than the amount of the transfer.
True, the absence of an express contract or expectation of payment most
probably renders a claim for services unenforceable against decedent's estate if a
bequest is not made, except in the extreme cases in which unjust enrichment can be
argued.'0 8 But in the situation at hand, the decedent has already made a payment,

"'°See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (1999); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 212 (1999).
"°6I.R.C. § 2512 (b).

'"7Cox & Rank, supra note 67, described in text accompanying notes 93-97.
08
" The application of contract law in this area is not entirely consistent. The usual case before

the courts involves services rendered to an elderly relative, for which the relative may (or
may not) have expressed an intention to reward the provider but died without doing so. The

provider then sues the decedent's estate for the value of those services, under a theory of
either implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment.
The implied-in-fact contract presumes that both parties understood that payment
would be expected. If either party reasonably believed the service was gratuitous, there can
be no recovery because there is no contract. Judy Becker Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual
Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 426 (1992). In addition, many courts adopt the
presumption that services provided by close relatives are gratuitous, e.g., Brown v. Brown,
524 A. 2d 1184, 1190 (D.C. App. 1987); In re Estate of Barr, 658 N.Y.S.2d 933, 36 (Sur.
1997). But see In re Estate of White, 521 A. 2d 1180, 1183 (Me. 1987)(holding that a family

relationship in itself does not necessarily raise a presumption of gratuity). The result is that
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the vast majority of service providers could not recover payment on an implied-in-fact
contract theory.
Success under an implied-in-law theory should be more likely but, in practice, is
still problematic. Here there is by definition no contract between the parties, so one need not
be proved. For recovery under this theory, one must prove the receipt of a benefit the
retention of which (without compensation) is unjust. Sloan, supra,at 427. The award to the
service provider is the amount by which the recipient has been unjustly enriched.
Farnsworth, supra note 105, at 197. At least one court has held that a secret non-expectation
of payment is not a controlling factor, nor does a presumption of intra-family gratuity apply
to cases developed on this theory; rather, what is central is whether the situation is such that
justice requires compensation. In re Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795, 798 (N. D. 1990).
However, the courts are far from consistent in their application of quantum meruit
to cases of services rendered to a decedent. On very similar facts, that of a long-time female
friend rendering personal care services to a male friend disabled by illness, the North Dakota
and Wyoming Supreme Courts reached opposite conclusions, chiefly because of which legal
theory the courts applied. The North Dakota court applied an implied-in-law theory, and
found that the exceptional nature of the services rendered conferred a valuable benefit on
the decedent. Even though the provider admitted she did not expect to be paid, the court
ruled this irrelevant to implied-in-law contracts. Id. On the other hand, the Wyoming court
utilized an implied-in-fact contract theory, thus requiring a showing of expectation of
payment. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (1995). Because the girlfriend admitted that
her motive was love and not payment, the court held that decedent had no reason to believe
plaintiff expected to be paid, and therefore she was not entitled to recovery.
Most other courts which have considered such issues have relied on an implied-infact contract theory, and thus either granted or denied recovery based on a showing of
expectationof payment. E.g., In re Estate of Barr, 658 N.Y.S. 2d at 936; Jones v. Van Vleck,
169 S.E.2d 178, 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969); In re Estate of White, 521 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Me.
1987); Logan v. Logan, 937 P.2d 967,976 (Ka. Ct. App. 1997); Clark v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431
(Wyo. 1998); Polletta v. Colucci, No. CV-950125416S, 1996 WL 571426 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 27, 1996); In re Estate of Argersinger, 564 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
Stemmer v. Estate of Sarazen, 362 N.W. 2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Cases nominally
involving contracts implied in law include Estate of White, supra,although since the trial
court found the existence of an implied-in-fact contract, this case is of doubtful value as an
implied-in-law case, and Swindell v. Crowson, 712 So. 2d 1162, 1163-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), in which the court denied compensation to a claimant who ran errands for
defendant, holding that there was no entitlement to unjust enrichment, and in any case
damages were too speculative. In short, while a service provider may make an unjust
enrichment claim on decedent's estate, his or her success on that claim is far from assured.
See, e.g., Sloan, supra at 460-61 (considering the application to palimony, and finding that
although courts in recent years have become more liberal, they still vary considerably in their
willingness to permit recovery on either implied-in-fact or implied-in-law theory). Therefore,
the analogy to contract law as courts have applied it in the context of estates does not at
present support the treatment of service provision as bargained-for exchange unless decedent
had clearly promised payment. The difference for the present argument, however, is that in
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which renders the question of contractual entitlement to payment less relevant. The
fact that a recipient may not have been able to enforce such a claim in court should
not in itself render the bequest gratuitous.
Note that a testator has no legal obligation to bequeath property to anyone.
Except to the extent that her state has forced-share provisions for spouse and/or
children, a testatrix who did not feel that her nearest kin deserved her money could
easily leave it all instead to charity. Many testators probably consider when making
estate decisions whether beneficiaries act as desired, and not merely in the direct
provision of personal services. In those situations, a bequest becomes compensation
for desired actions. In any case, for the purposes of estate taxation, Congress
certainly would have the power to enact a principle that a bequest constituted
compensation for services rendered. If a bequest is considered as compensation for
services, the logical form of taxation is by analogy to sales taxation of services. 10 9
Although one could as easily argue that such compensation is income 11 and should
be subjected to income taxation, excise taxation is more appropriate since the
Supreme Court has already chosen to define estate and gift taxes as excises.
Further, the government should encourage private transfers in recognition
of services rendered, for the greater the services provided to elderly parents by
children, the fewer the services needed to be provided by government agencies.
Again, one could make a case for no taxation at all, on grounds of public policy; but
at the least these services should not be taxed progressively. This is an issue which
to date has not been argued. Since the empirical evidence for the exchange motive
appears stronger for inter vivos transfers than for testamentary transfers, this could
form an argument against the "unified" transfer tax system, which in 1976 was
perceived to represent an improvement over the former separation of gift and estate
taxes. To the extent that the exchange motive dominates a transfer, perhaps the
transfer should be taxed as a sales tax if, indeed, it is taxed at all. Since sales tax

the case of bequests decedent has perhaps not promised but unquestionably has made a
payment; the relevant issue is decedent's motive in doing so.
"'0There currently is no federal excise tax on services in the United States, although there is
in Canada. Diane Carpentier, State Sales Taxes on Services: A New Perspective on the
"New" Old Tax, 1992 DET. C. L. REV. 561,584. Most states have sales taxes on goods, and
a few have extended the tax to include some services. Id. at 563. Some economists have
favored taxing services on the grounds that the line between goods and services can be hard
to draw; that goods and services are not analytically distinguishable; that such a tax would
render the sales tax less regressive, since the wealthier individuals consume relatively more
services; and with the post-World War II growth of the service economy, less distortion of
resource allocation would result. Id. at 585.
110I.R.C. § 61 (a)(1999) includes compensation
for services in its definition of gross income.
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rates fall far below the marginal unified transfer tax rates, this proposal carries
significant implications, primarily for taxpayer relief (since little revenue is raised
for the government by these taxes, as noted above).

IV. ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON INEQUALITY AND WORK INCENTIVE

The estate and gift tax is supposed to have two primary purposes: to raise
revenue, and to be a force in reducing wealth inequality, The first purpose it plainly
fails. Its continued survival therefore depends on whether it fulfills the second
purpose. But to answer this question, one must first ask why reduction in wealth
inequality is desirable.
Much of this argument as applied to inheritance rests on philosophical
considerations, such as whether one is morally entitled to wealth not personally
earned. To the extent that inheritance contributes to wealth inequality, the debate
is relevant - but will not be considered here. The economic arguments turn on
whether inequality benefits or harms the economy, through effects on consumption
and savings.
It has long been believed, whether correctly or not, that the rich have a
lower marginal propensity to consume than the poor, since they need not spend
most of any increase in income on basic necessities.111 Conversely, the rich are
thought to save increased additional amounts as income rises, invest their savings,
and thus provide for the growth of the economy. On the other hand, inheritance is
thought to diminish the work incentive of the recipients (though it might increase
that of the donors), and thus decrease economic productivity and growth.112

"'See e.g., Alan S. Blinder, DistributionEffects and the Aggregate ConsumptionFunction,
832 J. POL. ECON. 447 (1975).
" Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, examined these points with respect to progressive

taxation, and in light of the evidence available in 1952 found all arguments in favor of
progressivity unconvincing. They thought that economic stagnation was no longer a serious
problem which needed alleviation by redistribution of income to those with higher marginal
propensities to consume, and in any case enough opportunities for investment existed other
than meeting increased consumer demand. Id. at 448. Further, redistribution through
progressivity in itself would not ensure equal economic opportunity because many social and
cultural factors also contribute to economic advantage. Id. at 502-503. On the other hand,
they also believed that insufficient evidence existed in 1952 to support criticisms that the
progressive tax decreased work incentive or had significant negative effects on savings:
"However uncertain is our knowledge about the effects of progression on the incentive to
work, it is even less certain as to the incentive to save." Id. at 441.
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What is the recent empirical evidence on these points? Most of it is in
dispute. There is even some evidence that the marginal propensities to consume of
rich and poor may be about the same,113 in which case a redistribution should have
no effects on the economy through savings. On a national level, Blinder found that
a rise in an inequality index over a twenty-four year period after World War II is
associated with a higher average propensity to consume."1 4 Equalizing the income
distribution through bequests would either leave aggregate consumption unchanged
or diminish it slightly; he favors the explanation that while the marginal propensity
to consume may indeed fall as income rises, the addition to the labor force since
World War II of more young people and women has added more lower-income
recipients to the income distribution. Thus, aggregate consumption has remained
virtually unchanged even with our progressive tax structure.
One should also ask whether inheritance indeed contributes significantly
to the concentration of wealth, income inequality, laziness, collapse of the work
ethic, and other moral failings. Actually, this argument, carried to extremes, almost
defeats itself. If heirs quit working and spent their inheritance, their total wealth
would decrease, while the wealth of non-heirs who continued to work and save
would increase, thus creating re-equalization. Inheritance therefore may not make
much difference over the long run. If inheritance is only a relatively insignificant
source of inequality, the argument that taxation of inheritance is needed to promote
equality of opportunity and maintain economic growth may be misplaced.
Some empirical research, cited in Joulfaian and Wilhelm, concludes that
inheritance explains very little of lifetime inequality, perhaps because any tendency
it might have to increase inequality is indeed mitigated by the labor disincentive it
creates for its recipients." 5 Blinder agrees that while the distribution of inheritances
is very unequal, still, as compared with lifetime earnings, inheritance does not bulk
very large as a component of present wealth.1 16 This makes sense, for most
individuals receive a significant inheritance only once in a lifetime, but receive
wages for several decades. When the time value of money is incorporated, lifetime
earnings may easily dwarf inheritance. In general, estimates of the percent of wealth
accounted for by intergenerational transfers range between 20% and 80%, and

13
' Andrew

John Guilford, Comment, The Economics of Inheritanceand Its Restrictions - A

PracticalProposal,22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 903, 906 n. 10 (1975).
" 4Blinder, supra note 111, at 466.
1 1Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 78, at 1206.
16
1 Alan S. Blinder, A Model of Inherited Wealth, 87 Q. J. ECON. 608, 609 (1973).
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depend greatly on the specifications of the models used;1 17 most estimates are at the
low end of that range. Kessler and Masson conclude that the issue remains "largely
unsettled." 18
What of the reputed disincentive to work caused by inheritance? To
explore this, Joulfaian and Wilhelm utilized a life-cycle model with two different
sets of data. They estimated effects on hours worked and earnings of a variety of
factors, including actual and expected inheritance. One data set, of survey data,
yielded a statistically significant negative effect of both actual and expected
inheritance on hours worked for both men and women. However, this effect was not
large. For example, a $10,000 inheritance would reduce the labor supply by 2.4
hours annually.' 19 The elasticity for men was estimated at -0.00030; for women, a
12
somewhat larger elasticity of -0.00252.120 Both elasticities are extremely small. 1
The other data set consisted of 1982 IRS estate tax returns of decedents matched
with the income tax returns of those parents and their children for the years 1980-82
and 1985. This sample was restricted to children between the ages of 25 and 60, or
those who would be expected to be in the labor force, and nonfarm households. The
evidence from this data set of the effect of inheritance on household earnings was
very similar to that from the survey data on hours worked; the negative effect was
22
significant, but very small.

'Aaron & Munnell, supra note 16, at 130-31. See also Dennis Kessler & Andre Masson,
Bequest and Wealth Accumulation: Are Some Pieces of the Puzzle Missing? 3 J. ECON.

Summer 1989, at 141.(comparing estimates with those of other countries;
80% figure in particular is greatly exaggerated).
PERSPECTIVES,

"'Dennis Kessler & Andre Masson, On Five Hot Issues on Wealth Distribution,32 EUR.
ECON. REV. 644, 646 (1988).
19Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 78, at 1221. In an earlier study on the effect of an
increase in upper-bracket income tax rates, MaCurdy concluded that the evidence supported
the "view that raising upper-bracket tax rates is likely to induce relatively minor adjustments
in men's hours of work." Thomas MaCurdy, Work Disincentive Effects of Taxes: A
Reexamination of Some Evidence, 82 AM. EON. REV. 243, 248 (1992). The Joulfaian and
Wilhelm results concerning effects of inheritance are consistent: hours in the labor force,
assuming continued participation, are simply not very responsive to financial changes.
120Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 78, at 1221 n. 35.

'An elasticity of -1.0 would mean that a given percentage increase in inheritance would
produce an equal percentage decrease in hours worked; an elasticity with an absolute value
of less than one means that such a percentage change in inheritance produces a smaller
percentage change (far smaller, in the elasticities cited) in hours worked.
2
1 While the inheritance disincentive in earnings at the time of three
years after inheriting
exceeded that implied by the survey data, with an elasticity of -0.09954, if the statistical
anomalies from a few very large inheritances were excluded, the estimates fell to ones
approximating the survey results and the timing of the work disincentive advanced to the
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Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, using the same IRS data as Joulfaian and
Wilhelm but a different methodology, concluded that a large inheritance
significantly depresses the labor supply in the sense that it affects the decision to
participate at all. 123 Because the IRS data did not include hours worked, this study
looked at the association of the receipt of an inheritance of a given size with the
number of household members who were wage earners before and after the
windfall. Higher inheritances were associated with a greater propensity to exit the
labor market. The effect on household earnings, however, was small and was
strongest for households in which one member was a secondary wage-earner. It
appears that if an individual stays in the labor force, inheritance has only a very
small effect on the degree of his or her participation. Most salaried jobs by their
structure do not permit decisions by employees to work fewer hours. At the margin,
however, inheritance does carry some incentive for a household member to drop out
of the labor force, as one might expect intuitively. It would be interesting to
examine the use made of the freed time by the labor force dropout; implications for
national labor productivity would Obviously vary according to whether this time
was spent in early retirement and leisure, in caring for young children at home, or
in returning to school.
The Joulfaian and Wilhelm research also looked at the effect of inheritance
on food consumption; the effect was positive, significant, and small, with an
24
elasticity of less than 0.01 (which still exceeds the effect on hours worked).
Unfortunately, the data covered only food consumption, and it is entirely possible
that inheritances may have a much greater effect on nonfood luxury consumption.
On the other hand, the major effect could be on savings. Clearly, more research is
needed along these lines.
A further economic question is whether inheritances promote or decrease
wealth inequality, and what effect on this an estate or inheritance tax would have.
Kessler and Masson state that the more "comprehensive" simulation models "lead
to the conclusion that inheritances have little impact on inequality in annual income

year of the inheritance. Id. at 1225.
Tomes, though concerned primarily with testing the altruism hypothesis, also tested
for work disincentive effects as an explanation of his findings. Tomes, supra note 66. His
coefficient of inheritance on family income was positive, but on the margin of significance
at the ten percent level. The work-disincentive theory would imply a negative relationship.
He concluded from his simultaneous equation model that "I[t]he available evidence does not
support the work-disincentive hypothesis." Id. at 945.
123Douglas Holtz-Eakin et. al., The Carnegie
Conjecture:Some EmpiricalEvidence, 108 Q.
J. ECON.413 (1993).
124Joulfaian
& Wilhelm, supra note 78, at 1224.
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or lifetime resources but exert a highly disequalizing effect on current wealth,
especially in the upper tail." 125 However, these results depend largely on the details
of model specification.
Death taxes of any sort will come at least partially out of amounts saved
126
and will have a negative effect on capital formation and the incentive to save.
However, the magnitudes of these effects are unclear. 127 Stiglitz reasoned that on
the justifiable assumption that the marginal propensity to consume out of
inheritances is much lower than that out of income, the estate tax will reduce
28
savings, and thus lead to a lower capital-labor ratio in the economy as a whole.
If capital and labor cannot be substituted for each other easily (in economic terms,
if the elasticity of substitution between them is less than one), as appears the case
overall, a lower capital-labor ratio results in an increased share of capital in
economic earnings. Assuming (again, justifiably) that capital is more unequally
distributed than labor income, an increase in the proportion of income accruing to
capital may increase the inequality of wealth and income and, even more likely, of
consumption. An estate tax may therefore increase, not decrease, wealth inequality
unless the government takes strong counter-measures. Estate taxes may have an
additional effect on the form of the transfers to the younger generation; since
spending on children's human capital (e.g., education) is not taxed,1 29 there may
result an overspending on human capital relative to physical capital. 3 °
If the altruistic motive holds, inheritance should decrease inequality at least
within the family (no predictions can be made as to the effects under other
motives): But Becker and Tomes13 ' derived from such a model implications

125Kessler & Masson, supra note 118, at 647.
126Comment, supra note 113, at 911-12.
1271d. at 912.
12sJoseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution,and the Concept of Balanced
Growth
Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S 137 (1978).
29

1 Tuition and medical expenses are exempted from gift tax. I.R.C. §2503(e)(1999). Neither
are
such amounts included in donor's taxable estate.
'30Stiglitz, supra note 128, at S 149.
33'Gary
S.Becker & Nigel Tomes, An EquilibriumTheory of the DistributionofIncome and
IntergenerationalMobility, 87 J. POL. EcON. 1153, 1178 (1979). Their critical assumption
was that each family maximizes a utility function spanning several generations, subject to
its own income and inherited endowments of the children. Id. at 1181. From this utility
function and constraint, and with information on expected rates of return to investments,
parents would derive the optimal amounts to invest in their children (primarily in their
education). The equilibrium distribution of income in the economy in turn depends on
parents' propensity to invest in their children and the inheritability of ability.
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concerning the effect on inequality within society of government measures intended
to reduce inequality, such as the progressive tax system, with surprising results:
Although increased redistribution within a progressive tax subsidy system initially narrows inequality, the new long-run
equilibrium position may well have greater inequality because
parents reduce their investments in children [, discouraged by the
reduction in after-tax rates of return to such investment]. Perhaps
this conflict between initial and long-run effects helps explain why
the large growth in redistribution during the last 50 years has had
very modest effects on inequality.' 32
Extending the Becker and Tomes model to include uncertainty on the part of
parents about children's labor income, loannides and Sato found that "[u]sing a
concept akin to the coefficient of variation as a measure of relative inequality...
the distribution of wealth transfers is more equal than that of earnings and, in
addition, than that of capital income and of total lifetime wealth."' 33 If one assumes
for the sake of argument that a reduction in wealth inequality is socially desirable,
Blinder's model predicts that laws which encourage equal division of property, such
as a progressive inheritance tax, would have less effect in speeding equalization
than would policies such as equal access to education that break down economic
class barriers to marriage.134 All of these models assume that a progressive taxation
system would indeed work as intended, whereas the empirical evidence available
on the current U. S. transfer tax system135 suggests that this assumption may not
hold. In general, it appears that the economic evidence fails to support the argument
for progressive transfer taxation as a means of reducing wealth inequality and
boosting the economy.

1321d. at 1178.
33
1 Yannis M. Ioannides & Ryuzo Sato, On the Distributionof Wealth and Intergenerational
Transfers, 5 J. LAB. ECON. 366, 383 (1987). This represents some small advance in
economic knowledge since 1952; Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, at 496, responded to the
argument that inherited wealth is unearned and thus undeserved by the recipient and
therefore fair to tax or even to confiscate, by saying that "almost nothing is known about the
distribution of undeserved income" and that guesses about such distribution form a most
precarious base on which to rest a tax structure.
"'34Blinder, supra note 111, at 624. The strongest correlation of any two of his variables was
between
husband's and wife's educational levels. Id. at 624-25.
135 Wolff, supra note 8.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol15/iss1/2

28

Redman: Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax

2000]

RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE ESTATE AND GIFT TAX

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The economic virtues of progressivity are suspect. As applied to transfer
taxation, progressive taxation seems inappropriate regardless of the motive for the
transfer. For accidental bequests, what is taxed (progressively or otherwise) is the
inability to predict the future. The expanded estate equivalent exemption represents
a positive step in reducing the penalties for incorrect guesses concerning one's
longevity or personal need for lifetime savings. For altruistic bequests, while there
is no strong argument against progressive taxation, neither is there one to support
it because the economic evidence falls considerably short of demonstrating
advantages to the economy from the redistribution of wealth through progressive
taxation. The effect on the economy may even be negative. For strategic bequests,
an analogy to flat-rate sales taxation seems most appropriate.
How would one determine which motive prevailed in a given case? One
probably cannot. However, Congress has addressed this sort of problem before in
the tax code, when it replaced the requirement of determining the intent of the
deceased in making a gift (in contemplation of death, or otherwise) with the brightline rule that all transfers of certain types made within three years of death be
counted in the decedent's estate. 3 6 The Supreme Court has not decided a case on
this new rule, but is unlikely to revert to the analysis of Heiner v. Donnan, and is
more likely now than in 1932 to grant Congress wide latitude in taxation. While no
economic study has yet succeeded in determining conclusively the overall relative
incidence of these motives, it does appear that the strategic motive is significant.
Congress could justify basing estate tax policy on this motive at least as well as, and
probably better than, it could based on altruism.
Questions still remain, however, as to the preferred alternative. Does the
cost of administering the current system justify any transfer taxation at all? Or
should estate and gift taxation be retained at a proportionate rate? Should the post1976 unified system be retained, or should gift tax alone be eliminated?
Dobris has assembled a succinct argument to the effect that the drawbacks
of the current transfer tax system (the lack of meaningful revenue, its
ineffectiveness in furthering its intended social policies such as breaking up
concentrations of wealth, and its cost and inefficiency in its administration and
compliance) outweigh the small revenue and social benefits which result. 37 From
the standpoint of analytic consistency, because a person's economic resources are
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3366-68, referring to amendment of I.R.C. § 2035.
137Dobris, supra note 1, at 1217-22, 1234.
136
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equal to either the discounted present value of earnings plus inheritances, or the
discounted present value of consumption plus bequests,1 38 any system of taxation
should include both elements of whichever sum is utilized. The government
currently taxes the acquisition of the earnings, and through estate taxation taxes
inheritances, but the Dobris proposal would not tax the acquisition of inheritances
(though the federal income tax applies to income earned each year on the inherited
amount). However, if bequests/inheritances form a small part of total wealth,
especially in relation to the administrative costs of their taxation, as a practical
matter analytic consistency may yield to other considerations. Herein lies the
relevance of the empirical dispute over the percentage of total wealth accounted for
by inheritance, 39 and the magnitude of collection costs and evasion.140 Although
precedent for abolition of these taxes exists in other countries, such as Australia and
Canada, Dobris
believes that abolition in the United States is "perhaps not likely to
14 1
occur."

Short of total abolition of all transfer taxes, it would seem that gift taxation
at least could be eliminated altogether, since it accounts for the majority of IRS
paperwork and a minimum of revenue. Proportionate gift taxation, while
analytically appealing since everything else is taxed and inter vivos transfers bear
the closest resemblance to sales of services, has the disadvantage that it would
further decrease revenue while saving no administrative costs. The major drawback
to elimination of gift, but not estate, taxation is that it would provide an even
greater incentive to give inter vivos than existed before 1976. On the other hand,
such an incentive seemed to have little effect on behavior before 1976, explicable
by a variety of economic as well as noneconomic reasons (such as time preference
of money, strategic motives for gifts, and the need to have the last word even under
altruistic giving in order to maximize utility). Complete elimination of gift taxation
may also have little effect, especially if the three-year rule of estate taxation 142 is
retained and possibly even extended to include as taxable estate property all
138Aaron & Munnell, supra note 16, at 119, 120.

139Kessler & Mason, supra note 118.
"'Wolff,
supra note 8.
'41Dobris, supra note 1, at 1216. Canada's case should perhaps not be given the same
weight, since one of the major arguments for federal repeal in Canada was that estates were
subjected in effect to double taxation. Any capital gains of a decedent were determined to
be realized on the date of death, and thus subject to a capital gains tax. Richard M. Bird,
Canada'sVanishing Death Taxes, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 133 (1978). The arguments in
Australia, on the other hand, greatly resemble the arguments concerning the United States
tax. Willard H. Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in
Australia, 35 TAX LAw. 113 (1981).
"I2I.R.C. § 2035 (a), (c)(1999).
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transfers of all types made within three years of death. (As indicated supra, the
Supreme Court may by now be willing to permit this rule.) Not many donors can
predict their death three years ahead of time; this in itself should discourage overgiving inter vivos.
If one accepts the logic of the preceding paragraph, one might also advocate
a system of proportionate (not progressive) estate taxation coupled with the present
increased exemption and no gift taxation. This at least would result in a lesser
incentive to give inter vivos than if estate' tax rates remained progressive and gift
tax was eliminated. It would also better accord with the economic evidence on
motives for bequests. However, the original question of whether the revenues from
estate taxation justify the costs of having the system in place becomes even more
urgent if such revenues as previously existed become significantly less due to the
removal of progressive rates. Under the former steeply progressive income tax
structure, progression contributed a very minor fraction of total revenue.'43 Estate
taxation may well exhibit the same pattern, especially since in 1997 more than 57%
of the returns filed concerned estates of under a million dollars and an additional
1
nearly forty percent accounted for estates between one and five million dollars. "
Some empirical evidence would be helpful.
If, however, one believes strongly that transfers inter vivos and at death
should be treated equally, or if one prefers on more pragmatic grounds not to
disaggregate the transfer tax system again with resulting temporary confusion, one
might prefer to retain the present unified system, with its increased exemption but
with proportionate tax rates. Even with proportionate tax rates, the existence of the
exemption creates a significant degree of progressivity because estates above the
exemption level will carry a greater share of the tax burden than those below.145 The
question of effect on revenue, described above, again becomes relevant. In addition
to the economic rationales described above, proportionality in itself carries less
incentive to alter behavior than does progressivity because less benefit from tax
avoidance ensues. Less reason exists to reduce an estate to a certain level under a
uniform tax rate than if the reduced level also means that a lower rate would be
used to compute the tax. This argument, made originally to criticize the former
steeply progressive income tax rates,' 46 applies no less to any sort of progressive tax
structure.

14'Dan Throop Smith, High ProgressiveTax Rates: Inequity andImmorality? 20 U. FLA. L.

REv. 451,459 (1968).
'"I.R.S. Data Book (Pub. 55B, 1997) at 10, Table 11.
'"Smith, supra note 143, at 460.
'461d. at 459-60.
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A recommendation for proportional taxation says nothing in itself about
what the proportionate tax rate should be. This discussion has proceeded on the
assumption that a low rate, rather than the highest rate, should prevail. The
increased exemption in most cases will render largely irrelevant more of the lower
marginal rates, thus creating an even sharper discontinuity (and incentive to evade)
when an estate reaches the exemption level. The marginal rate for a $600,000 estate
is 37%, for a $1 million estate 41%, and the highest marginal estate tax rate is
55%.147 Since the U.S. Supreme Court has declared estate and gift taxes to be excise
taxes, 148 one could argue that appropriate estate tax rates should more nearly
resemble sales and excise tax rates. The United States currently has no federal sales
tax. Canada enacted a federal value-added goods and services tax of 7%, and a 1990
U.S. federal excise tax on certain luxury goods was 10%. 149 State sales tax rates
generally do not exceed 10%. Even if one prefers a federal income tax analogy, on
the grounds that the inheritance represents something akin to income to the
beneficiary,' 150 and one purpose of the gift tax was to supplement the income tax, the
highest marginal income tax rate is currently 39.6%.5i In any event, the estate tax
rate should be lower than at present.
Most of the transfer tax debate to date has concerned whether estate
taxation should exist at all in anything resembling its present form. Proposed
alternatives such as consumption taxes and accessions taxes (which, as taxes on
147

§ 2001 (c)(1)(1999).
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (estate tax); Bromley v. McCaughn,
280
U.S. 124 (1929) (gift tax).
149Carpentier, supra note 109, at 583 n. 136, 584. By way of comparison" the Ontario
provincial
sales tax is 8%.
5
1.R.C.

4'New

1 As suggested by Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts

andBequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177 (1978). Dodge recommended replacement
of the separate estate and gift tax system with the income tax proposal. However, this would
involve subjecting transfers to the same progressive rate schedule as incomes, with the
economic effects noted supra, and would create a new set of theoretical issues, discussed
by Dodge. Id.
The income tax proposal was also made in Canada. In 1967, before Canada
abolished its federal estate tax, the Canadian Royal Commission recommended that in place
of the estate and gift tax, gifts and inheritances be taxed like any other form of income to the
donee. Bird, supranote 138, at 141; Young, supra note 25, at 79. This recommendation was
not adopted; before its release, the federal government substantially revised its system to one
resembling the current U.S. unified transfer tax system. The revision was not popular, for
reasons having to do with popular perceptions of double taxation, and the desire of the
provinces to control this area, and was eventually repealed altogether. Bird, supra note 138,
at 136-37.
511I.R.C. § l(a)(1)
(1999).
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inheritances rather than the estate, would create an incentive under progressive rates
but not under proportionate rates to distribute estates among multiple
beneficiaries) 152 tend to take for granted the progressive framework. Outright
abolition, while appealing in many ways, need not be the only other option.
Policymakers should hear the case which can be made for proportionate rate
taxation, and give it serious consideration.

52
' Aaron

& Munnell, supra note 16, at 138. The accessions tax would thus also serve the
purpose of reducing wealth concentration, at least on an interfamily level. Id.
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